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INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY 25X1A9a

Greece

Formation of KKE Regional Council for

Government-held Macedonia 25X1A6a

PLACE ACQUIRED

SUBJECT

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SUPPLEMENT TO

25X1X6 REPORT NO

- 1. It is reported that on or about 8 February 1949, Tassos Petrides (member of the Politburo of KKE and leader of the KKE Reserve Front in Salonika), was informed by the Politburo that Party organization in Government-held Macedonia was to be altered immediately. A Regional Council for Governmentheld Macedonia with Petrides as its head was now to be formed with headquarters in Salonika.*
- The Regional Council would consist of:

Tassos Petrides

: First Secretary

Anastasios Tsikares

Second Secretary and instructor

Orestes Stephanides

Representing Salonika

Colonel Georgios Erythriades

: Representing Regional combatant organizations

Katy Tassopoulou

Representing women's organizations

Symeonides (fnu)

Representing the EAM Panhellenic Youth Organization - Eamike Panhellenike Organosis Neolaias -EPON)

Erythriades and Tsakires were not present in Salonika, but their arrival was expected in the near future.

3. A Salonika Town Instructional Committee would also be set up, consisting

Orestes Stephanides Alexandros Vougias Maria Demetriadou Kouvelas (fnu)

STATE

ARMY

First Secretary Second Secretary

: Women's organization

Vougioukas (fru)

EPON Finance

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- h. Petrides had received a letter from Demetrics Vlandas (member of the Politburo) written after the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee had taken place, to the effect that
 - a. From the time of Varkiza (February 1945) until recent months, KKE had paid far too little attention to party instruction and the strict application of Markist-Leminist doctrine. This had inevitably resulted in reactionary deviation and defeatism, particularly in the Rebel Army, of which less than twenty percent of the troops were estimated to be Party members, and where strict Party discipline was therefore all the more essential.
 - b. The growth of defeatism in the Rebel Army could be gathered from the following figures:
 - 1946: total strength about 8,000. Surrenders amounting to about fifteen percent.
 - 1947: total strength rose to approximately 15,000 through mass recruiting, in spite of losses and surrenders. Surrenders, however, rose to about twenty percent.
 - 1948: strength rose to over 25,000 and surrenders to about twentyfive percent of effectives.
 - c. To combat this growing defeatism, the Party had decided in the autumn of 1948 to place trained Communist instructors in all Rebel Army units. Results were considered satisfactory in that the increasing tendency towards defeatism had been halted.
 - d. On the question of policy, Vlandas noted that in June 1948, before the Grammos battle began, the Cominform had recommended that the Party should continue the struggle only if it were satisfied with, and able to meet, the following conditions:
 - that the Rebel Army would receive no support from the Soviet Union and the "popular democracies" beyond the dispatch of supplies and moral encouragement, there being no possibility that armed assistance would be given.
 - 2) if the fighting was to continue, it was essential that the Rebel Army be converted into a well organized "popular revolutionary army" with a sound basis in Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
 - 3) that mass uprisings in the towns was an indispensible corollary to the struggle, since without this it lacked a proper proletarian character.
 - 4) that the basis of the struggle must rest on the thorough "enlightenment" of Party members and not on mass appeal, which would result only in defeatism or deviation.
 - e. If these conditions were felt to be impracticable, the Cominform had recommended that KKE should endeavor to come to terms with the Athens Government and resume its place as a lawful political party.
 - f. The Polithuro had examined the situation carefully in the light of the above conditions and had come to the conclusion that they should continue fighting, at the same time doing their utmost to implement the recommendations of the Cominform. The subsequent successes of the Rebel Army on Vitsi, at Karditsa, Naoussa and Karpenision had provided



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justification of their decision, and the morale of the Greek Mational Army and people had fallen appreciably during this period. The peacefeelers put out over the Rebel radio had been successful propaganda and had contributed to the lowering of the enemy's morale,

- Vlandas concluded by forecasting Greek National Army offensives in the spring in Central Greece, on Vitsi and on Grammos. He said that these offensives would be broken against mountain fortifications now being prepared, and that the Rebell Army, with increased fire power, and with air support, would then sweep forward in a counter-attack with every chance of success.
- By 14 February 1949, Tassos Petrides had laid down the following division of responsibilities within the Regional Council:
 - All political matters, including "instruction" and the supervision of the "cleansing" of Party committees in the towns, would be handled by a committee consisting of:

Tassos Petrides Orestes Stephanides Katy Tassoupoulou Anastassios Tsikares Symeonides (fnu)

b. An independent recruiting committee would be formed, which in conjunction with Party committee; in the towns, would organize recruiting both for the combatant organizations in the towns and for dispatch to the Rebel Army. This committee would consist of:

Colonel Georgios Trythriades, representing regional combatant organizations.

Symeonides (fnu), representing EPCN

Katy Tassopoulou, representing women's organizations.

Lieutenant Colonel Kyros Tsakires, who would represent Salonika combatant organications on the new Regional Council, had been briefed at the general headquarters of the Rebel Army to organize a new series of sabotage operations in Salomika. He had just visited Salomika and was on his way to the Khortiates "yiafka" to take over from Lieutenant Colonel Demetrios Mandelas. His preparations would be made in consultation with headquarters of 6 Army Division, whose area included Salonika. It was the responsibility of the Regional Council to offer every moral and material help to groups of saboteurs who entered the town. This assistance would be coordinated by Erythriades in consultation with a three member committee to be appointed by the Regional Council.

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Comment: By the middle of February, this organization only existed on paper, although stranuous efforts were being made to bring it into being.

